They having arrived, but in no sufficient quantity, the army was put in motion in the direction of Little Rock on the 18th of May. It was now two hundred miles distant from the terrains of the railroad whence it received regular supplies. The rain poured down daily; the country, in comparison of all other countries which the troops had seen, was "a dreary wilderness." Nevertheless, they trudged on through the mud and mire without murmuring, obtaining scanty supplies of food along the line of march, husbanding that which had been brought from the north for future exigencies, until the roads became absolutely impassable. The rains had made all this part of Arkansas a vast dismal swamp. And so the little army, on short rations, and scantily clothed, slowly waded its way back to Batesville, the capture of Little Rock, under these circumstances, being deemed impracticable. Having through great hardships again reached Batesville, the army went into camp, and there with such patience as could be mustered, awaited the improvement of the roads. During the halt here, the army was scattered about the country again, in such localities as could do best toward keeping the detachments from downright starvation.

During the latter part of June, the little army was concentrated at Jacksonport, near the junction of Black with White River. A rain of supplies had recently reached this place from the north, its guard having had incredible difficulties in convoying it through a wide extent of hostile country. Nor were the supplies sufficient in quantity to give the troops full rations for a single week. They had already suffered so from the want of rations, and had stripped the country roundabout for many miles so entirely bare of food, that there was not left, perhaps, a pig, a chicken, or a pound of meal, which could have been taken without the utmost injury to the inhabitants. On the 4th of July the starving army moved "in search of supplies," marching along the ban of White River, and hoping to meet other Union forces at Clarendon, a distant hundred miles from Jacksonport. Clarendon was duly reached, but the forces which had been stationed there were now withdrawn. The column then wheeled to the left, and after three more days of suffering from the scorching sun, hard marching, hunger, and thirst, came out of the wilderness, and found food, raiment, and rest, at Helena, on the 14th. Even Helena was gladly hailed by the famished and entirely ragged troops, with enthusiastic expressions of satisfaction. They had now been in the field for five and a half months , nearly all the time in that section of America which may well enough be regarded as what one soldier called:

"The heathendom of our land--a region whose physical aspects are uninviting and uninteresting, and whose inhabitants, for the most part, are rude, unlettered, unacquainted with law, and regardless of right; whose savage barbarities perpetrated upon aged Union men and defenseless women during the early stages of the rebellion, had in them only the quality of unmixed atrociousness." The great novelist of humanity has most appropriately placed the scene of her darkest pictures of slavery-- the avarice, the debauchery, the savagery of Legree, the murder of Uncle Tom--on the border of this gloomy region, the hither frontier of which was traversed by General Curtis's little army."

Curtis’s march through the wilderness of Arkansas was, on all accounts, one of the severest of the war.

A number of cotton speculators followed the advance of the Union army to reap rich harvest in getting possession of that staple. General Curtis, in attempting to control these rapacious speculators and use the cotton in a way to bring the greatest benefits to the government, made enemies of many influential men of wealth, who were looking solely to personal gain. Helena and the surrounding country had a large slave population. As the negroes came into the Union lines the commanding General found another serious problem confronting him. The government had adopted no settled policy to govern the action of the department commanders in the matter and each had to upon his own judgment.

Whilst the camp was near Helena, during this period, the regiment made a few expeditions into the country, which were of no great importance. Among these expeditions were: One, which purposed moving up the Arkansas River a considerable distance, but which failed of accomplishing its object, whatever that might have been, on account of the low stage of water; another, made near the close of November into Mississippi, as far as the railroad leading north from Granada, destroying the railroad for some distance. When the troops returned they brought with them large quantities of cotton, supplies, and many horses.

During a considerable portion of the period in which the Fourth Iowa had its encampment at Helena, General Curtis was in command of the district. It was a time when new questions were perplexing, in their abstract phases, the minds of our statesmen, and presenting numberless difficulties in the way of their practical solution to the minds of our commanding officers. Perhaps there was no officer surrounded by more difficulties of the nature here referred to than General Curtis. His head-quarters were at a place which may fairly be described as the southwestern outpost. Beyond him, on the right of the Mississippi, lay a vast extent of territory in the undisputed possession of the insurgents. On the left of the Mississippi to the southeast, the rebels had everything their own way, holding without opposition the richest portions of the confederacy, abounding in wealth and military resources. Below him the enemy held Vicksburg, the key to the navigation of the great river, and laughed at the impotent attempts to deprive him of his advantage. But to the northward navigation was unobstructed, and the conquests of northern arms during the year had opened up a wide area of country to trade, which had theretofore for some time been hermetically sealed to the enterprise of our merchants and speculators. By this time there was a most profitable demand for the staple productions of the South, and Helena swarmed with those who were anxious to take advantage of it. The Treasury Department had established no rules governing trade in the districts recently conquered from the insurgents. The whole subject was in a state of confusion most sadly confounded, and decidedly uncomplimentary to the practical abilities of the authorities at the national capital. General Curtis was perforce compelled to assume jurisdiction over matters more properly cognizable by civil functionaries, or see his camps changed into markets for cotton and dens of thieves. Moreover, the negro question, notwithstanding the sensible solution which had early been given to it by Major-General Butler, was still, for all practical purposes, in a most chaotic and indeterminate state. Helena was surrounded by negroes, who, lately the slaves of men now waging war against the Union, were left in an undefined status by their fugacious masters; but who, themselves true to the Union, were certainly, on that account, entitled to respectful consideration, if not to army rations. In his practical solution of both questions--the cotton question and the negro question, that is, to put them briefly, General Curtis was guided by thoughtful wisdom, and the dictates of philanthropy and patriotism; but it was impossible for him to decide them wisely, philanthropically and patriotically, without incurring the displeasure of many who were both able and willing to inflict damage upon his reputation. His solution of the questions was very simple. He banished the crowds of speculators from his camps, leaving the business of cotton buying to a few gentlemen of character and standing, who had been recommended to him by the authorities at Washington; and, instead of supporting the negroes at the public expense, he gave them control over the cotton of their rebellious masters, which had been planted and cultivated by their own labors. This policy, so wise and just in itself, and which resulted so beneficially to the government, nevertheless received the emphatic opposition of large numbers who had crowded into Helena for the purpose of making hasty fortunes, and of all those army officers, both regular and volunteer, whose accomplishments in the matter of Christian civilization taught them to think considerably less of a human being of a dark color than of army mule, or horse of any color. His administration at Helena during this period was afterwards the subject of investigation by a military commission, over which Major-General McDowell presided; but its investigations, though of an ex-parte nature, entirely failed to connect General Curtis with any speculation, so that the President, Abraham Lincoln, was constrained to declare, with an emphasis unusual to his cautious nature; that there was not a word of evidence against him. This just conclusion came, indeed, too late to maintain the General in command of the Department of Missouri, to which he had been meanwhile assigned; but in time to preserve his reputation unsullied from the attacks of dissipated generals and trimming politicians who had assailed him. But, inasmuch as he had in the fall of 1861 assisted the same class of men to ruin General Fremont, he must have reflected, as he yielded his command to Schofield, that there is sometimes a degree of poetic justice to be observed in the affairs of men.

Meantime; however, and before the worst vicissitudes of fortune befell the General, for an administration whose wise and philanthropic measures should have secured for him the gratitude of the country and the thanks of the government, the little army which had so heroically followed him through victory and suffering in Arkansas, passed under the control of others. When he left Helena, the Fourth regiment bade him an affectionate farewell, destined to be the last during the war, "the men all joining in the ceremony with unaffected feeling."

The Vicksburg campaign opened in November when Grant established a base at Holly Springs, Mississippi, and prepared to move down the Yazoo River and on to Vicksburg. Sherman moved down the Mississippi to the mouth of the Yazoo, and up the Yazoo to Chickasaw Bluffs; on December 29, he attacked the Confederates at the Bluffs and was repulsed.

Grant's first attack on Vicksburg came from the north. On December 8, he instructed Sherman to take command of all the troops at Memphis, move with them down the river to Vicksburg, and, with the co-operation of the gunboat fleet, "proceed to the reduction of that place in such manner as circumstances and your own judgment may desire." The preparations, writes Sherman, "were necessarily hasty"; as it turned out he had inadequate forces for the task assigned him. His plan was to move on Vicksburg from Cape Bayou, off the Yazoo River, and attack at Chickasaw Bluffs, located just north of the town.

The Fourth then subsequently joined General Sherman's army in the movement down the Mississippi River, against Vicksburg, in which it bore a most conspicuous part. On December 28 and 29, 1862, it participated in the desperate fighting at Chickasaw Bayou, suffering severe loss, and duplicating its record of gallantry at Pea Ridge. To ease Sherman's task, Grant would continue his southward movement parallel to the Mississippi with the goal of diverting the attention of the Vicksburg defenders. Grant was distracted by problems and diverted his attention from Vicksburg to solve some family matters. Supposed "friends of the family" were using Grant's camp to black market items.

The Confederates were making extraordinary efforts to improve their defenses in the Vicksburg area. Jefferson Davis had sent Lieutenant General John C. Pemberton, a southern-minded Pennsylvanian, to take charge of Confederate forces in Mississippi, and then had installed over him as commander in the West one of the South's premier officer, General Joseph E. Johnson. Pemberton conceived a double-barreled raid on the Federal rear. First, he ordered major General Earl Van Dorn to descend with his cavalry on Holly Springs and cut Grant's supply line as the Union general moved south.

While Van Dorn was attacking Holly Springs, Brigadier General Nathan Bedford Forrest, an unorthodox but highly effective cavalry officer, was leading his Tennessee cavalry brigade against the Federals near Jackson, Tennessee. In a series of engagements he cut Grant's line of communications at a second point.

The two Confederate raids caught Grant in enemy territory without supplies and he had to hasten back to Memphis the way he had come. He sent word to Sherman that the two-pronged attack was no longer possible. Grant's communications lines were in such disarray that the message arrived too late to stop the waterborne assault.

Sherman and Porter were hoping to fall without warning upon the Vicksburg defenses. Sherman was to loose his element of surprise because a private planter who had installed his own telegraph line along west bank of the Mississippi north of Vicksburg. On Christmas Eve, the Confederates received warning that the Federal troops were moving on the Mississippi.

Brigadier General Stephen D. Lee received the warning. By the time Sherman's troops landed 12,000 Confederate men were waiting along the 10 mile ridge Chickasaw bluffs. Another 13,000 Confederate troops were on the way.

On the 20th of December, 1862, General W. T. Sherman was joined there by General Steele and his command. The army, which filled a hundred transports, then continued the journey to Milliken's Bend, about twenty-five miles above Vicksburg. On Christmas evening orders were issued for the fleet, next day, to attack Vicksburg. Grant's retreat had liberated the Confederate army, which had been gathered at Grenada to oppose his advance, and, unknown to Sherman, it had hastened to the defense of Vicksburg.

Vicksburg, it is well known, is on the bank of the Mississippi, about two miles below a sharp bend. The course of the river; in fact, forms a peninsula here, in front of Vicksburg some five or six miles long and about one mile wide. Opposite the point of this peninsula Chickasaw Bayou flows into the river. Its whole length is only about seven miles. It flows from the Yazoo, taking first a course not far from south, and having reached the vicinity of the line of bluffs about two miles from its source, follows their general direction toward Vicksburg. It is; however, some hundred yards from the base of the hills, which are about three hundred feet high, and extend in a general range as far as Haines' Bluffs. The Yazoo flows parallel to the bluffs for some five or six miles, and about four miles distant. The space intervening is, for the most part, low and swampy, abounding in lagoons, quicksands, and bayous.

Protected by abatis covering rifle pits, with the bluffs as strongly fortified as skill and slave labor combined could make them, the place was absolutely impregnable from assault, when defended by a large army. The mighty task which Sherman attempted was simply impossible, but somewhere in the long line he hoped to find a weak place where the army could force its way. The men were in excellent spirits and anxious to be led against the stronghold. Porter's gunboats were ready to render all possible assistance. The troops were landed along the Yazoo River on the 26th of December.

On account of the difficulties of landing, the debarkation of the army was not effected till near night. The lines extended along the river-bank about six miles, General A. J. Smith on the right, next to him General M. L. Smith, then Steele's division, next General Morgan, whose division on the evening of the 26th, held the extreme left of the line. On the morning of the 27th, General Steele embarked Thayer's and Hovey's brigades and went some two miles up the Yazoo, debarking some distance north of Chickasaw Bayou. On the 28th, he advanced toward the bluffs, and had some severe fighting. The only route by which he could approach the bluffs, was along a narrow causeway, raked from one end to the other by the artillery of the enemy. The First Iowa battery, Captain Griffiths, and Landgraber's battery opened on the rebels, and after a severe cannonading caused the abandonment of two of the enemy's batteries. Still the causeway was commanded by other artillery, supported by sharp-shooters, and the attempt to gain the bluffs by this route was abandoned. Steele reembarked on the night of the 28th, and on the next morning took position south of Chickasaw Bayou still holding the left of the line. Meantime, the other portions of the army had moved up to the bayou, fighting as they marched, and on the morning of the 29th were ready to cross and assault the enemy's works.

The position of the Union forces at this time was as follows: General Morgan on the south side of the bayou; on his immediate right, was General Blair's brigade; General M. L. Smith's division, now commanded by General David Stuart, General Smith having been severely wounded on the evening of the 28th, was on the right center; General A. J. Smith was moving up to the extreme right, and General Steele was coming up on the left. Several bridges had been constructed across the bayou beforenoon.

During the night before, the troops, lying cold and comfortless in their dark bivouacs, heard trains of cars moving into Vicksburg from the east. They were bringing heavy reinforcements to the rebels. Early on the morning of the 29th, the rebel batteries commenced a heavy cannonade, principally directed against the center held by Morgan. With occasional cessations it was kept up all the forenoon, during which time there were several engagements of infantry, as opposing regiments came within reach of each other. General Sherman had issued no order announcing an hour for the assault, but by order of General Morgan, Blair threw his brigade across the bayou above where it bends to the right, and forming in line marched through sloughs, bayous, quicksands, and abatis, upon the first line of rifle-pits. Colonel De Courcy's brigade, of Morgan's division, marched against the works at the same time. Both passed gallantly through a murderous fire, and carried the first line with a dash, and soon after the second. But the whole force was still under destructive fire. Thayer had been ordered to support Blair. He crossed a bridge lower down the bayou, moving by the flank but with only one regiment--the Fourth Iowa. The next regiment, the Thirtieth Iowa, was directed to take a different course by General Steele, and those coming after followed this. Thayer sent back for support, but without waiting for it to come up, charged the works in his front, about two hundred yards to the right of Blair, and about the same time, with the Fourth Iowa Volunteers alone. They carried the first line of works, drove the rebels from their second line, and there remained under a terrible fire waiting for support, scores of the best men in the command falling at every discharge from the enemy's batteries and sharp-shooters. But the support did not come, the couriers sent for it being killed or wounded on the way. General Thayer rode along his little line, and absolutely shedding tears at sight of so many brave men falling around, addressed the troops in a few as grateful words as ever fell from the lips of a stout-hearted commander. Receiving no intelligence from his absent regiments, he gave the order to fall back, which these heroic men obeyed, retreating slowly and sternly under the same fire through which they had passed on their perilous advance. A portion of Blair's brigade had advanced to the base of the bluffs, where they had a hand-to-hand contest with the enemy there posted, but the main part of General Morgan's division was not moved across the bayou in time to take part in the assault, whilst but one regiment of the division under Stuart was able to cross the bayou at all. So the assault was only made on the left, and by about three thousand men, of whom about eight hundred were killed or wounded. There were several sharp encounters along the whole line, but the unsuccessful assault on the left was the battle of the day.

In the engagements near Chickasaw Bayou, there were several Iowa regiments and batteries which behaved with that high degree of credit which the troops of the State everywhere maintained throughout the war, but no regiment from any state ever behaved with a more devoted gallantry than "the old Fourth," in the assault of the 29th of December. says Colonel Williamson, with terse expressiveness:

"Every officer and man did his whole duty, and regretted that he could do no more. The regiment went into the action with four hundred and eighty men and officers, of whom one hundred and twelve were killed and wounded. Among the killed was Lieutenant E. C. Miller, of Company G, who had command of the skirmishers on the 28th. No braver officer has fallen in his country's cause."

The army remained near the scene of its defeat a few days, caring for the wounded, and burying the dead. Preparations were also made for an attack on Haines' Bluffs, but it was wisely abandoned. On the 2nd of the January, 1863, the troops were all on board "the miserable transports" again, and soon on the way down the river. At the mouth of the Yazoo, the fleet was met by the steamer Tigress, having on board Major-General John A. McClernand, to whom General Sherman reported. In a day or two, the latter issued a general order, in which he said:

"A new commander is now here to lead you. He is chosen by the President of the United States, who is charged by the constitution to maintain and defend it, and he has the undoubted right to select his own agents. I know that all good officers and soldiers will give him the same hearty support and cheerful obedience they have hitherto given me. There are honors enough in reserve for all, and work enough, too. Let each do his appropriate part, and our nation must in the end emerge from this dire conflict purified and ennobled by the fires which now test its strength and purity."

It was, perhaps, impossible for William T. Sherman to submit to the military authority and guidance of John A. McClernand without a feeling of bitterness. Every man of genius is apt to have a knowledge of the fact, and it is not unlikely that a man of General Sherman's military genius can tell a martinet at sight, from a soldier of real capacity. I am not so unjust to proper discipline as to say that General McClernand amounted to a martinet, but it is certain that General Sherman must have had very incorrect ideas both of his own and of McClernand's military talents not to have felt chagrined at his own inferior command.

General Grant, long afterward learning of the gallant conduct of the regiment, commanded by general order that the Fourth Iowa Infantry have inscribed on its colors, "First at Chickasaw Bayou." All the brave fighting and sacrifices of that bloody battle were in vain, as it was not possible for the gallant army and its able commander to take that strongly fortified city by assault, and it was an undeserved humiliation for the President to remove General Sherman from command, by placing over him General McClernand. The attack was a failure, costing 1,776 Federal lives compared to 187 Confederates. The next day the troops moved again to give battle.

The Fourth Iowa was during the campaign led by McClernand against Arkansas Post and was commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Burton. The regiment landed the 9th day of January, 1863, on the banks of the Arkansas river, below the rebel fort, out of range of their guns and began a march late in the evening through swamps and brush; the weather was cold and chilly and the entire night was occupied in surrounding the fort; when daylight appeared, the army had completely encircled the enemy’s defenses and without preparing a bite to eat, the men were ordered at sun up to advance on the rebel’s works. The Fourth soon found the rebel position strongly defended in their front by two batteries of 10 pound parrot guns, and strong entrenchments from which a vigorous fire was poured in upon the Fourth all day, but fortunately the Fourth were in a thickly wooded section and suffered but slight loss as by ther methods of fighting every man was expected to find cover where an opportunity offered itself. By 4 o'clock in the afternoon of the 10th of January, the Fourth had advanced so close to the enemy works that the sharp-shooters finally silenced the rebel guns by picking off every man who attempted to load or operate them. So when the order came to charge, 30,000 men in a solid line came on with a yell and the brave defenders ran up the white flag and surrendered their little army of 5,000.

The Fourth had lost all its baggage and most of its camp equipage in the repulse at Vicksburg, two weeks before, so the men had not had a change of clothing for nearly a month, and were literally covered with vermin. Seeing a camp kettle filled with boiling water, some men took off their wool shirts and boiled the life out of every grey back, and then hung them up on a stick at the fire to dry and the men went in search of something to eat. When they came back, nothing could be seen of the shirts except about six inches of the sleeves. They had fallen into the fire and were entirely consumed. Finding themself cold and shivering without a shirt, several started through the regiment on a hunt for shirts, but every comrade reported only one on hand and that one on their backs. Finally they heard of a man in one of the companies who had just returned from a furlough, and had the only knapsack in the regiment. Fortunately he had extra shirts and very cheerfully handed them out when he was told of the misfortunes.

On the return to the boats, the rain and sleet continued to pour down upon the unprotected heads, as they trudged upon their way. The march continued until 10 o'clock that night when the men came to the landing, but the boat had not arrived, so they were ordered to bivouac for the night. Tired and hungry they wrapped themselves in their blankets and laid down to rest, but "we were all so wet and cold we could not sleep" Marching all the night before, through swamps and in battle all day, with nothing to eat but hard bread and a chance cup of coffee and at last to lay down in their wet clothing after a long fatiguing march that night seemed more than the human body could possibly endure.

About midnight the rain changed to snow, and strange to say, the men soon fell asleep. The coming of snow seemed to shut out all the wind and cold. When the army rose in the morning the broad plantation which the army slept on was dotted over, as far as the eye could see, with spots of bare ground where the soldiers had laid under their covering of snow, "like so many cattle that had laid out at night in a snow storm." That morning the fence rails served a good purpose, "and the fire built of them warmed that army into life." Soon the boats appeared and the regiment was ordered to take the deck of the John J. Roe. The ship soon steamed down the river, but the decks of the boat were covered with ice which could not be removed and the motion of the boat "added to our discomfort by increasing the force of the cold winter winds from which we had no protection." That night the Fourth reached the Mississippi and it grew colder, some wood was obtained which was burnt in small pieces in the mens’ camp kettles on deck of the boat to warm the men’s hands and make coffee. An officer of the boat became alarmed for the safety of his craft, rushed up and began emptying the contents of the camp kettles overboard. The infantry men in turn seized him and had he not desisted would soon have "found himself in the muddy waters of the Mississippi." That night the men laid down to rest and the heat of everyone’s bodies drove the frost from the icy deck in spots where every man had laid, but when the regiment reached Young's Point opposite Vicksburg, of the 500 men present in the Fourth Iowa, 400 of the men were reported on the sick list.

In January, 1863, the Fourth was again in the army before Vicksburg, where for two months, were spent the darkest days of its service in the cypress swamps, under the frowning batteries of the enemy Toiling on the famous canal, struggling in mud and rain, lying in camp through that dreary winter, while Grant was working out the great problem of how to subdue the Rebel stronghold and open the Mississippi River. With Steele's Division, the Fourth embarked on steamers. On the 1st of February, 1863, General Grant, commanding the army in front of Vicksburg, made his appearance among the men of the Fourth and gave them confidence. The high water had broken the levee on the Mississippi side and overflowed the country for many miles and gave the federal boats an opportunity to go out for many miles inland. Gun boats accompanied transports far into the interior navigating Steel Bayou, Black Bayou, Deer Creek and the Big Sun Flower. These expeditions were sent out in the hope of reaching the Yazoo river above the impregnable position of Haines’ Bluffs, so that Vicksburg could be attacked in the rear, but every effort in that direction failed. No other man except Grant, would have undertaken a movement of so much peril. In many places trees had to be cut off under water to make a channel through dense forests and many of the boats came back minus their smoke stacks and otherwise damaged. Heavy details were then made to work further on the canal across the Peninsula opposite Vicksburg. The river front at Vicksburg was fortified for ten miles with guns of large caliber and it was believed that by cutting this canal through, the channel of the river would be directed and the fleet could pass through it and avoid the rebel forts. The work went on all through February and March, but the rebels discovering them at work planted a large gun on the opposite side of the river from the lower end of the canal and soon obtained complete range. Some men who happened to be standing near by watching the progress of the work on the canal the morning the guns opened fire recalled "and the way those big shells came crashing through the tree tops over our heads caused us to beat a hasty retreat to a point of safety."

The regiment was surprised one night when all were asleep, the levee had broken and the floods came in upon them, and they had to wade out through the cold muddy waters for half a mile to higher ground on the levees and stay there until daylight came to show them dry grounds on which to pitch their tents. A slight raise in the ground near the steamboat landing, offered a place for the camp, but the place turned out objectionable because the hospital boat came there every morning and unloaded the dead to be buried in the levees. Sometimes the rough boxes containing bodies of unfortunate comrades would be piled up 8 feet high awaiting burial. The interment was made by a detail every day, side by side they were buried in the levees.

One of the worst afflictions the men suffered at this time was scurvy, a disease that comes from a lack of vegetable food. Many poor fellows lost their fingers and toes from this terrible disease. Hard bread, coffee and bacon was the daily food. They were so far away from the base of supplies that nothing but the substantials could reach them until at last some noble hearted man hearing how they were suffering from scurvy purchased with his own means in the Chicago market, a whole train load of potatoes, onions and cabbage and forwarded them to the troops. One soldier wrote, "I shall never forget the relief and enjoyment that brought to us."

In passing through all these trials and privations of camp life, it was a noticeable fact that there was very little complaining. To illustrate, the magnificent temper of the American soldier, I will give an instance to show how quickly they will turn a discomfort into a joke. One night, the 29th of March, 1863, the regiment was wrapped in slumber when a terrible storm struck the Fourth’s camp and hurled the tents into the air and poured in upon the men’s unprotected heads a shower of cold rain. Some witty fellow started up a loud lamentation how he had left a good home, etc. and this started the fun, turning the distresses into hilarity and good feeling--in the midst of the confusion. The Sergeant Major of the regiment stepped up to one soldier and remarked, "That scene is wonderful. The American soldier is the only soldier in the world that will laugh at his own calamity."

On the second day of April, General Steel's division of which the Fourth Iowa Infantry was a part, embarked on the Fany Ogden and took a course up the river, arriving at Greenville, Miss. on the 5th day, where they disembarked and made a raid out into the country. At this point, the rebel cavalry came in frequently and fired at the boats, and the information had come to General Grant that large quantities of corn and provisions were being drawn from this locality to Vicksburg to support the rebel army. On the night of the 5th, the regiment camped 18 miles from Grennville on Deer Creek, in a cane break. Next day they followed the banks of Deer Creek all day long. A soldier of the Fourth recalls:

"Both shores were lined with stately trees, the branches bending to the water, the stream was deep and sluggish. The bright rays of a southern sun were bringing to life the green leaves. Birds of rich plumage sung their spring songs, and the fields were beginning to ear their cost of green and the broad fields in each passing plantation were being tilled and worked by the slaves of the master. As we followed the winding road so broad and beautiful and level all day long, I looked with envy on the many comfortable homes and then as I cast my eyes to the other bank of Deer Creek and saw the vast multitude of negroes who had escaped from their masters and were trying to get to us."

On May 1st the regiment marched from Millekens Bend, in the direction of Grand Gulf. Some of the fleet ran the batteries of Vicksburg the previous night which several men reported hearing. Then on May 2nd, large bodies of troops were seen moving. At this time Grant's army was reported to be 50,000 strong, and there was a flurry of great activity and excitement. By May 3rd the troops were marching all day through swamps and over corduroy bridges. On May 9th and 10th the Fourth Iowa marched and counter marched; and the men reported seeing thousands and thousands of Federal troops; the road was strewn with broken wagons, muskets and knapsacks of the retiring foe. "Dead horses, cattle and hogs thrown into all the creeks, wells and springs to destroy the water. Very warm and dusty and suffered terribly for water on one-quarter rations." By May 11th the army received news of the capture of Fredericksburg with 12,000 prisoners by Hooker. May 12th heavy cannonading was to be heard in the front. Some men told of how "a New York regiment came in with their ears cut off by the rebels while foraging." May 13th saw the men marching at sun up with no breakfast. They also made a raid on a fine mansion, and found General Sherman in the house. They were then ordered to the support of McPherson at Battle of Raymond. The enemy numbered about 5,000, but were quickly routed and driven in direction of Jackson. A Fourth Iowa man found a brother on the field wounded. By May 14th heavy rains poured down, hungry and tired the army swooped down 20,000 strong on Jackson, drove out Johnston's army of 12,000. Grant rode at the head of the 4th Iowa as it entered the city. During May 15th and 16th the regiment pillaged an destroyed the city, railroad, and rebel stores. The regiment then marched at noon of last day on hearing the cannons roar at Champion Hills 20 miles away. The Fourth reached the field at midnight after Grant had overwhelmed an defeated Pemberton's army of 25,000 taking 2,000 prisoners and 20 pieces of artillery. Grant’s losses were about 2,500. Another hard day occured on May 17th. The Fourth marched at sun up to Black River and crossed over on pontoons. The enemy was driven from their works at Black Bayou Ridge at the point of the bayonet, leaving 11 pieces of artillery and 3,000 prisoners in Grant’s hands. May 18th the army again marched at sun up, the Fourth regiment in advance, and the whole army enveloping Vicksburg, Herman's corps occupying the right flank. The Fourth drove the enemy into their works; they made a stubborn resistance; and many said "in the evening our hearts were gladdened by a sight of the Mississippi River north of Vicksburg." The regiment then proceeded to plant the battery that broke the enemy’s line extending from Vicksburg to Haines Bluffs. Darkness settled over, and the regiment laid on their arms that night. May 19th saw the regiment advance at sun up to find the enemy had fallen back inside their works at Vicksburg, leaving open the communications with the Yazoo River on the north. Brisk fighting occured all the day, and the 4th and 26th Iowa were drawn on to a masked battery and driven back with a severe loss. Early on May 20th the fleet opened fire from the front and the 4th was involved in hard fighting all day with nothing gained. On May 21st the Fourth saw more fighting all day; with heavy losses on both sides. The regiment received supplies from the Yazoo River, the first in 21 days; sent 6,000 prisoners north. On May 22nd Grant’s army charged the enemies all along the line, but they were repulsed with a loss of 5,000 men.

June 22nd saw the enemy try to break at night about 9 o'clock on the left and were driven back with a loss of 500 men. Joe Johnston was reported on the west side of Black River with 40,000 men to raise the siege; and relieve Vicksburg, 20,000 troops were sent out to meet and drive him back. However, on June 24th, the enemy appeared uneasy and as if fixing some way to get out of "their precarious situation". Quite a severe was fire kept up on the enemy all day; the enemy returned the fire rapidly on the river bank to keep the regiment from fortifying at that place. June 25th saw one of the enemies forts blown up by troops in McPherson's Corps who undermined it and put 6 barrels of powder under, which was ignited, tearing the fort to pieces after which there was opened a terrific fire from the artillery which was followed by a charge of the infantry on the works, but the charge was unsuccessful, there was a desperate fight on the left. On June 26th, occured heavy fighting on the center of the demolished fort, federal forces fought by reliefs, two regiments on the firing line for about two hours and off the line for about six. The rebels held one side of the fort and the federals the other; the fighting was very desperate, yet the loss on the federal side was quite light. The rebels were driven away from their demolished fort at about 9 o'clock at night, and federal troops occupied it. Federal gunboats engage the batteries in front on the 27th. In the evening the firing was very heavy for three hours. June 28th saw very little firing, "the Sabbath appears to be strictly observed." The regiment chaplain preached at 3:30 under the shade trees. June 29th, the rebels opened a heavy artillery fire on the rifle pits held by the 9th Iowa, killing one and wounding another man of that regiment at a point only 20 feet from the rebel stockades near their works at the top of the hill, but a shell or two from the federal batteries soon silenced the enemies guns. On June 30th, the rebels came out with a flag of truce for the object of passing out a British subject, a woman, but Grant refused to pass her out. "The rebs say they are preparing to celebrate the 4th of July in Vicksburg."

The next month opened very differently. The enemy's fire was very weak, except their reply to federal batteries on the point opposite Vicksburg. On July 2nd, the enemy tried to drive back federal General Logan's division, but were severely repulsed. The next day a flag of truce came out of Vicksburg. Very little firing occured along the line except at the water batteries, which kept up a vigorous fire upon federal mortars all day. The next day dawned a new. All firing was ordered to be stopped; the enemy proposed terms of surrender. The enemy fired a salute of 13 guns at sunrise; the northerners responded with 34 guns, both sides firing blank cartridges. Confederate General Pemberton surrendered at ten thirty, and Grant’s army took 32,000 prisoners, 150 pieces of artillery. This was a glorious 4th to Grant's Army. During the siege the regiment lost in killed and wounded about eighty men.

Following report was written by J. A. WILLIAMSON, Colonel, Commanding 4th Iowa Infantry.

"HEADQUARTERS FOURTH IOWA INFANTRY
Battle-field near Vicksburg, Miss., Dec. 30, 1862

CAPTAIN: I have the honor to make the following report of the part taken in the battle before Vicksburg on the 28th and 29th instant by the 4th Iowa Infantry.

Early on the morning of the 28th I took the position assigned me on the right of the brigade. In obedience to the orders of the general commanding the brigade, I detailed 30 men from my regiment, under command of 1stLt. E. C. Miller of Company G, to act as pioneers and skirmishers. Of these 30 men one was killed and five wounded during the day. The regiment remained in position on the right of the brigade all day, at intervals under the fire of the enemy s artillery, without becoming generally engaged. Late in the evening the regiment fell back with the brigade to the transports and reembarked during the night and moved down the river two or three miles.

At daylight on the 29th the regiment again debarked and took the advance of the brigade, marching about two miles, to a point near where Gen. Morgan's division was engaging the enemy. At this point the regiment was commanded to halt, where it re mained until about 3.30 o'clock, when I received orders from the general commanding the brigade to charge the enemy's intrenchments, about one-half mile distant, near the base of the hill. There is near the base of the hill a slough, or, more properly, a swamp, which could only be crossed at one place (a narrow causeway which had been constructed), and at that only by the flank of the regiment. As the head of the column emerged from the crossing it became exposed to a terrific fire of musketry from the intrenchments in front and also to a fire from the enemy's batteries on the right and left flanks. These batteries were so situated as to perfectly command this point. After effecting the crossing the head of the column filed right, the left coming forward into line, the right resting on and inside (the side next the enemy) of a strong abatis, which had been formed by the enemy for his own protection. Here I was informed by the general commanding the brigade that contrary to his orders the regiment was not supported by others, and that I should hold the position I then had until he could ascertain if support was coming, providing I could do so, leaving me to judge of that matter for myself. I held the position about thirty minutes under a fire which cannot be described. At the end of this time, seeing that I had no support and that none was coming; that my regiment was the only one on the field; that my officers and men were suffering dreadfully from a fire which could not be returned effectively, I gave the order to fall back, which was accomplished in good order though with great loss. The regiment went into this action with 480 men and officers of whom 112 were killed and wounded.

Among the killed was Lt. E. O. Miller of Company G, who had command of the 30 men on the 28th. No braver officer has fallen in his country's cause. Under any circumstances the loss of so many brave men is a matter to be deeply deplored, but in this instance it is doubly painful, as no advantage commensurate with the loss was obtained. The officers and men of the regiment join me in tendering the general commanding the brigade our earnest, heartfelt thanks, both for the part he took in the charge, going as he did at the head of the column, and for the manner in which he spoke of the action of the regiment in the field.

It would be invidious to speak of individual acts of bravery, as all did well. Every officer and man did his whole duty and regretted that he could do no more."

The regiment was among those which, immediately after the capitulation of Pemberton, moved out to join General Sherman in the second movement against Jackson; this move resulted in the recapture of that capital in less than a fortnight from the surrender of Vicksburg, and compelled Johnston to evacuate the entire state. In the pursuit of Johnston's army the regiment went as far as Brandon, where there was a brisk combat with the rebel rear guard. Destroying the railway there, the command returned to Jackson, did its part in the wholesale destruction of railways and public property which followed. The encampment of the brigade of which the regiment formed a part, and which brigade was now under command of Colonel Williamson, was not very far from the railroad bridge over Big Black River, fourteen miles in rear of Vicksburg, where it remained from July 29, 1863, until September 22, 1863 being engaged in a sever skirmish at Coldwater, Mississippi, on August 21 and another sever skirmish at Baldwyn’s Ferry, Mississippi, on the Big Black River, on September 11, during which one enlisted men was killed and three enlisted men were missing. The men pitched their tents, and remained in camp untill they started on that memorable campaign which resulted in raising the siege of both Chattanooga and Knoxville, in East Tennessee, and the spirits of Unionists all over the land.

Colonel Williamson was now in command of a brigade. The regiment was in Osterhaus' Division in his expedition to Corinth, Iuka, and Cherokee Station, and took part in several engagements. At Cherokee Station on the 21st of October the regiment lost one enlisted men killed and five enlisted men were wounded. It saw action again with the skirmish at Cane Creek, Alabama, the engagement at Little Bear Creek, near Tuscumbia, Alabama, where two enlisted men were wounded, and during a second engagement at Cherokee Station, during which three enlisted men were wounded. It then embarked on steamer and proceeded to Memphis, Tennessee, from which place it began the march ending at Chattanooga, Tennessee, where it arrived November 23, 1863. In the Battle of Lookout Mountain the Fourth was on the extreme left of Hooker's command. When the battle opened, the division moved across an open field to Lookout Creek, where it was "for some time exposed to a severe fire", but finally moved on up the mountain, "where the fight was warm".

The morning of November 24th opened with a cold, drizzeling rain. Thick clouds of mist were settling on Lookout Mountian. At day break Geary’s division, and Whitaker’s brigade of Cruft’s division, marched up to Wauhatchie, the nearest point at which Lookout Creek, swelled by recent rains, could be forded, and at 8 o’clock they crossed. The heavy clouds of mist reaching down the mountian-side hid the movement from the enemy, who was expecting and was well prepared to resitst a crossing at the Chatanooga road below. As soon as the movement was discovered, the enemy withdrew his troops from the summit of the mountian, changed front, and formed a new line to meet our advance, his left resting at the palisade, and his right at the heavy works in the valley, where the road crossed the creek. Having crossed at Wauhatchie, Whitaker’s brigade, being in the advance, drove back the enemy’s pickets, and quickly ascended the mountian untill it reached the foot of the palisade. Here, firmly attaching its right, the brigade moved along the side of the mountian, and through the valley, reaching this point at 11 o’clock, just after the bridge was finished, and as Osterhau’s division and Grose’s brigade were crossing.

Hooker’s command, now united in the enemy’s field, was ready to advance and sweep around the mountian. His line, hanging at the base of the palisades like a great pendulum, reached down the side of the mountian to the valley, where the force that had just crossed the creek was attached as its weight. Now, as, at the command of Hooker, it swung forward in its upward movement, the artillery of the army, on Moccasin Point, opened fire, throwing a stream of shot and shell into the enemy’s riflepits at the foot of the mountian, and into the works thickly planted on the "White House" plateau. At the same time the guns planted by Hooker on the west side of the creek opened on the works which covered the enemy’s right. Then followed a gallant assault by Osterhaus and Grose. After fighting for nearly two hours, step by step up the steep mountian side, over and through deep gullies and ravines, over great rocks and fallen trees, the earthworks on the plateau were assulted and carried, and the enemy was driven out and forced to fall back. He did so slowly and reluctantly, taking advantage of the rought ground to continue the fight.

It was now 2 o’clock. A halt all along the line was ordered by General Hooker, as the clouds had grown so thick that further advance was impracticable, and as ammunition was almost exhausted and more could not well be brought up the mountian. But all the enemy’s works had been taken. Hooker had carried the mountian on the east side, had opened communications with Chattanooga, and he commanded the enemy’s line of defensive works in Chattanooga Valley.

At 2 o’clock Hooker reported to Thomas and informed him that he was out of ammunition. Thomas at once sent Carlin’s brigade from the valley, each soldier taking with him all the ammunition he could carry. At 5 o’clock Carlin was on the mountian, and Hooker’s skirmishers were quickly resupplied. And so ended this great battle "fought about the clouds".

The 4th Iowa showed great gallantry in this attack. It was the first to place its banner on the point of Lookout Mountain and General Butterfield, who was General Hooker's chief of staff, stated to General Dodge and Williamson that he knew personally it was the first regiment to reach the top of Lookout. From the reports from the regiment and from the reports of other officers it was Williamson's bridge of Osterhaus' division of the 15th Army Corps which was the first to reach and take the point of Lookout Mountain.

Following report was written by George Burton, Lt Col., Commanding 4th Iowa Infantry:

"HEADQUARTERS FOURTH IOWA INFANTRY
Lookout Mountain, Nov. 25, 1863

CAPTAIN: I have the honor to report that, agreeably to your order, about 7 a.m. of yesterday the 4th Iowa Infantry moved forward and took a position on a hill immediately in front of Lookout Mountain, and near the Tennessee River, supporting the 1st Ohio Battery [Battery K, 1st Ohio Artillery] there planted.

About 11 o'clock, when the engagement became spirited on the right by the personal order of BrigGen. Osterhaus, I sent forward 50 of my regiment as skirmishers, under command of Maj. Nichols, to the bank of the creek skirting the base of the mountain near the river, and engaged the attention of the enemy at that point. I also shortly afterward, by further direction of Gen. Osterhaus, moved the regiment down the hill in advance of the battery, sustaining and relieving.

About 4 p.m. I received an order from Colonel -------, on the staff of MajGen. Hooker,

to report forthwith with the regiment to BrigGen. Geary, commanding [2nd] Division, [XII] Corps.

I thereupon crossed the creek, and under the direction of Gen. Geary, arrived and ascended the mountain, reaching a position assigned us near the cliffs about dark, and awaited orders. Soon afterward I relieved the 24th [?] Ohio Infantry., who represented themselves as out of ammunition. Here our right rested on the base of the cliffs connecting onto the left of the 36th Indiana, on line extending directly down the mountain, our left joining at right angles the right of the 31st Iowa. While here the regiment assisted materially by its enfilading fire in repulsing two charges of the enemy, and must certainly have inflicted upon them a severe loss.

About 1 a.m. of to-day we were relieved by the 7th Ohio. Too much praise cannot be awarded both officers and men for the coolness, promptness, and firmness with which they advanced to and held the various positions assigned them, in nearly every case under a heavy fire. Our loss in the day’s engagement was one killed and six wounded."

When morning dawned, it was discovered that the enemy had withdrawn to Missionary Ridge. Early in the morning, November 25, 1863, the Fourth, Ninth and Thirty-first were sent to Rossville Gap, and placed in a good strategic position, turning the Rebel left. They were attacked by a heavy column of the enemy and a fierce battle ensued in which the Fourth bore an active part until the Rebels were routed. It joined in the pursuit on the 26th and at the Battle of Ringgold, the next day November 27, 1863, and fought with great gallantry, saving two railroad bridges, which were set on fire by the retreating army.

Following report was written by George Burton, LtCol., Commanding, 4th Iowa Infantry:

"HEADQUARTERS FOURTH IOWA INFANTRY
Camp near Ringgold, Ga., Nov. 28, 1863

LIEUTENANT: I have the honor to report that, about 10 a.m. of yesterday, we arrived at Ringgold, and were immediately ordered by Col. J. A. Williamson to follow the 76th Ohio Infantry, and move by the right flank in rear of the center of that regiment for the purpose of supporting it. The 76th Ohio at this time was in advance of us, moving to a point at the base of Taylor's Ridge, a short distance to the east of the town. On arriving at the base of the hill, I obeyed the order strictly until the regiment was half way up the ascent, when, at the request of the major commanding the 76th Ohio, I brought my regiment into line immediately in his rear, still moving steadily forward. When near the crest of the hill, the men of both regiments, from the steepness and ruggedness of the ground and the heaviness of the enemy's fire, being somewhat deployed, the regiment was ordered to fix bayonets, and charge in line with the Seventy-sixth. The order was gallantly obeyed; the crest of the hill was taken and held for about ten minutes, when the enemy, being in heavy force, rallied in our front and charged upon our right and left flanks simultaneously, at the same time pouring upon us a heavy direct and enfilading fire. Under these circumstances, having no support, we were compelled to fall back about 30 yards down the hill, where we succeeded in holding our position until re-enforcements arrived. About 2 o'clock we again advanced and scaled the hill. The enemy, however, had by this time evacuated his position. Under the order of Col. J. A. Williamson, who was present, we now moved a short distance along the ridge toward the gap near the town, when we advanced down the hill and drove the enemy from the railroad bridge, which they were endeavoring to destroy. While the regiment was putting out the fire on the bridge nearest the gap, by further order of Col. Williamson, I sent Maj. Nichols, with 40 men, to save the railroad bridge in advance on the road by which the enemy had retreated, which was also in flames.

Both officers and men merit the highest praise for their coolness and bravery during the day's engagement. Our casualties were seven killed, 24 wounded, and one missing."

The following report was written by J. A. Williamson, Colonel 4th Iowa, Commanding 2nd Brigade, 1st Division:

"HDQRS. SECOND BRIG., FIRST DIV., XV CORPS
Camp at Ringgold, Ga., Nov. 28, 1863

CAPTAIN: I have the honor to report the action of this brigade in the battles of Lookout Mountain, Missionary Ridge, and Ringgold, including all its movements from the 24th until the evening of the 27th instant.

The brigade is composed of the 4th Iowa Infantry, commanded by LtCol. George Burton; the 9th Iowa Infantry, commanded by Col. David Carskaddon; the 25th Iowa Infantry, commanded by Col. George A. Stone; the 26th Iowa Infantry, commanded by Col. Milo Smith; the 30th Iowa Infantry, commanded by LtCol. A. Roberts, and the 31st Iowa Infantry, commanded by LtCol. J. W. Jenkins. At the hour named in the order of the night previous the brigade moved, following the 1st Brigade, to a point in front of Lookout Mountain, near where the attack was to be commenced, and formed line of battle by battalions en masse at deploying intervals. Very soon after my line was formed I received an order from you to send a regiment to support a battery on the hill immediately in front of Lookout Mountain, and commanding that portion of it when our troops were making the attack.

I detached my right regiment, the Fourth, and sent it to the place designated. Soon after this I received another order to send one more regiment, to report to yourself, for some purpose unknown to me. In obedience to the order, I sent you the Twenty-fifth.

The four remaining regiments I held in line until about 11 o'clock, when I received an order from Gen. Osterhaus to send another regiment to support a battery of Parrott guns immediately in our front. In obedience to this order, I sent the Thirtieth.

I was then ordered to follow in the direction the 1st Brigade had taken with my three remaining regiments, which I did, until I arrived at the crossing of Lookout Creek, at

which place Gen. Osterhaus ordered my rear regiment (the Ninth) to remain and receive all the prisoners then there and those to be sent back. I crossed the creek with my two remaining regiments, when Gen. Hooker in person sent another regiment (the Twenty-sixth) down the railroad to support some troops at a point or gap somewhere toward our left.

I then proceeded up the mountain side with my one remaining regiment (the Thirty-first), accompanied by Gen. Osterhaus in person, with a part of his staff, and came up with the 1st Brigade at a point where troops not belonging to the 1st Division were in line, engaging the enemy. At this point I had some doubt as to where I should place my regiment on account of a dense fog which had settled down on the mountain side and prevented me from seeing the location of our troops, but soon found the line formed by a part of the 1st Brigade, and placed the regiment on the left of it. I was very soon joined by the Ninth and Twenty-sixth, which had been relieved and sent up to me, and placed them in line. At this place I learned from Gen. Osterhaus that the 4th Iowa had been sent forward early in the day, and that they were at that time somewhere up the mountain side; also that it had behaved well in the morning in driving the enemy from their breastworks. About 2 p.m. an aide-de-camp from Gen. Hooker ordered me to relieve a regiment of Gen. Geary's command, which was in the extreme front, under heavy fire and out of ammunition. I immediately sent my adjutant-general, Capt. George E. Ford, with the Thirty-first Regiment, to relieve the regiment, which was the -------.

While my adjutant was there he found the 54th Ohio [?] also of Gen. Geary's command--was out of ammunition, and relieved it with the 4th Iowa, which he found up at the front.

After these regiments had been eight hours under fire, they sent me word that their ammunition was nearly exhausted. I immediately informed Gen. Osterhaus of the fact, and was informed by him that the Twenty-fifth and Thirtieth Regiments of my brigade, which had been left behind, must relieve them.

Captain Ford then started on foot in search of these regiments, but they had been ordered to different points, and could not be found, the captain returning after several hours' walk, nearly worn out by his unceasing exertion in the discharge of his duty.

In the meantime, before Capt. Ford returned, I applied to Gen. Geary, asking him to relieve my regiment, inasmuch as they had relieved his in the first instance. He refused to do it. I then took some ammunition from the remaining regiments with me to the regiments under fire, and afterward, at about 1 a.m. went to Gen. Geary and procured 8000 rounds of ammunition to replace what had been taken from my regiments.

Soon after 2 a.m., the enemy having previously ceased firing and retreated, Gen. Geary relieved the Fourth and Thirty-first regiments, and they fell back to their places in line of battle.

Early in the morning of the 25th, the Thirtieth and Twenty-fifth Regiments, having been relieved by Gen. Butterfield, of Gen. Hooker's staff, reported to me, and took their positions in line, thus bringing my brigade together for the first time since the morning previous. About 9 o'clock on the morning of the 25th, my brigade was ordered to march toward Missionary Ridge. When we arrived near the pass where the enemy made the first stand, I received an order to take two regiments and ascend the hill in the left of the gap or pass.

I accordingly took the Fourth and Thirty-first and pushed rapidly to the top, meeting with but little opposition. I pushed my skirmishers forward into the valley, where I expected to find the enemy, but they had gone. I remained on the top of the ridge for a short time, until the Ninth and Thirtieth Regiments came up (the Twenty- fifth and Twenty-sixth having been ordered by Gen. Osterhaus to take a position on the western slope of the ridge to keep back any flanking force of the enemy which might come from our left), when I went forward to the valley, and then moved out by the flank, through the gap, down the pass to the open ground, when I was ordered to make a short halt. While at the halt, two men of the 9th Iowa captured Lt. Breckinridge, a son of MajGen. John C. Breckinridge of the Confederate Army. In obedience to orders, I again proceeded up the main road by the right flank, still leaving the Twenty-fifth and Twenty-sixth in the position which had been assigned them. The road on which I marched was up on a ridge east of and parallel with Missionary Ridge. I had not proceeded far before I heard heavy firing toward the front, on the left flank.

I immediately ordered the Fourth Regiment detached, and deployed it as skirmishers on my left flank, and soon discovered that the enemy occupied that part of Missionary Ridge where I had been but a short time before, and then moved my brigade forward, in line of battle, obliquely to the right, closing up on the 1st Brigade, at the same time bringing my left forward, in line with Gen. Cruft's division on my left. I then received orders from Gen. Osterhaus to go rapidly forward in line.

This movement was executed gallantly by the four regiments of the brigade present going down the side of the ridge we were then on and up the steep ascent of Missionary Ridge, all the time under a heavy fire from the enemy, but driving them before us.

As I ascended the hill, I was in much doubt and perplexity as to whether I might not be inflicting severe injury on my own skirmishers, and also on the right of the division on my left.

This uncertainty kept me from reaching the summit as soon as I otherwise might have done; but, notwithstanding this, I think I may justly claim that one of my regiments (the Fourth)was the first to reach the top, and that the brigade was there as soon as any other troops.

I took a great number of prisoners, but could not state accurately how many, as I ordered them to be left behind under a very small guard, while the command pushed forward, and before I could ascertain the number they were turned over to the officer who seemed to be taking charge of all prisoners. The brigade captured as large a number as did any other command.

Many instances of personal bravery might be mentioned, but it must be sufficient to say that all of the regiments did well. Lt. W. M. Stimpson, of my staff (of the 30th Iowa Regiment), received a wound in the head in the beginning of the engagement, but continued to discharge his duty until the end.

The brigade encamped on the field (here the Twenty-fifth and Twenty-sixth came up, having been relieved) and took care of our wounded, and buried our dead during the night. On the following morning, after picking up a large number of arms, delivering them to ordnance officer, I moved forward, following 1st Brigade, and encamped for the night four miles east of Chickamauga Creek.

On the morning of the 27th, the brigade marched at 5 o'clock toward Ringgold, where it arrived about 10 o'clock and found the enemy strongly posted on a range of hills, known as Taylor's Ridge, a short distance to the east of the town. Gen. Osterhaus ordered me to send one regiment to support the 76th Ohio of the 1st Brigade, which had been sent with a view to taking the hill. I immediately ordered the Fourth Regiment forward, instructing its commander to push forward and render all the assistance possible to the regiment in front, and then, in obedience to an order from Gen. Osterhaus, I brought forward another regiment (the Thirty-first), and placed it along the railroad to act as sharpshooters, to cover the advance of the two regiments sent forward.

Finding that the two regiments sent up were meeting with stubborn resistance, I took two other regiments (the Ninth and Twenty-sixth) and went forward with them in person, advancing up the side of the hill (which might be more properly called a mountain) until I came in line with the 4th Iowa and 76th Ohio on their left.

In the meantime, before I could get the two regiments (the Ninth and Twenty- sixth) up, the 4th Iowa and 76th Ohio had advanced to the top of the hill, but for the want of support, after suffering severe loss, had been compelled to fall back a short distance (not more than 50 or 60 paces from the summit), where they were when I came up.

While I was gaining this position my two remaining regiments, the Twenty-fifth and Thirtieth, had in obedience to my order gone up to my left and were fast approaching the top, their skirmishers being not more than 75 paces from the summit, when three regiments (as I am informed of the XII Corps) came up, one on the left of the Twenty- fifth-and one between the Twenty-fifth and Thirtieth, the other passing through the Twenty-fifth by the flank.

Col. Stone ordered and begged them to go up on his left, but the officers in command said they had orders for doing as they did, and persisted in their course. At this time the fire of the enemy had almost ceased, but they could be plainly seen making dispositions of their forces to repel the advance of these regiments. Col. Stone cautioned them that the enemy would open a destructive fire on them if they went up in the manner they were going. They replied they would teach "Western troops a lesson," and advanced a short distance farther, when the enemy opened a terrific fire on them. They stood manfully for a minute or two, when they gave way, and came down like an avalanche, carrying everything before them, and to some extent propagating the panic among my regiments.

The fault of these regiments seemed to be more in the way in which they attempted to go up the hill than in anything else. While Col. Stone preferred the method of taking it by skirmishing and cautiously advancing, the regiments above named tried to go up as if on parade where the men could barely have gone up by clinging to the rocks and bushes. Cols. Stone and Roberts did all they could to hold their men together, and soon succeeded in restoring order and confidence, and again went up the hill.

Having no support on the right, and those regiments on the left having given way in confusion, I found it would be folly to try to carry the hill until I should be re- enforced, and accordingly made the best disposition of my force to hold the ground already gained, and sent a messenger to inform Gen. Osterhaus of the fact, and received from him an order to hold my position and await re-enforcements.

I held my position for a short time. No re-enforcements or support coming to my aid, and finding that the fire from the enemy had slackened, I again went forward and gained the top of the ridge and found the enemy retreating, and a strong force farther on burning the railroad bridge across East Chickamauga Creek. I immediately went forward, keeping up a heavy fire, and drove them away before they accomplished their work.

I had the fire put out on the first bridge, and sent Maj. Nichols of the 4th Iowa, and a small party of men, who volunteered for the service, to put out the fire on the bridge farther on. This he accomplished, after driving a much larger force than his own away.

I cannot speak too highly of the conduct of Maj. Nichols throughout all the campaign, and especially in every action. First Lt. Charles W. Baker of Co. C and 2ndLt. Thomas H. Cramer of Co. K, 4th Iowa, both distinguished themselves in the front of the fight, capturing prisoners from the very midst of the enemy. Lt. Cramer was instantly killed, after making a capture of a lieutenant and several men, and Lt. Baker mortally wounded (since dead) while heroically cheering the men on. Maj. Willard Warner, 76th Ohio, and his officers and men won my unqualified admiration.

Many instances of heroic daring and bravery came under my observation, and would be reported specially if regimental commanders had furnished me the names of the parties. Capt. George E. Ford, my assistant adjutant-general, was severely wounded in the leg while trying to prevent the troops on my left from giving way, during the engagement at Ringgold. Lt. L. Shields, aide-de-camp, also received a slight wound in the hip at the same time. I am much indebted to my staff officers-- Capt. Ford, Capt, Darling, and Lts. Shields and Stimpson--for their efficient services. Accompanying this report you will find list (not found) of killed and wounded of the several regiments in the different engagements."

After these battles the Fourth moved to Woodville on the Memphis and Charleston Railroad and went into winter quarters. On the 25th of February, 1864, the men were mustered in as veterans, and were granted furloughs. They reached Des Moines, Iowa, on the 9th of March, while the Legislature was in session, which adjourned to give the veterans a royal reception. The ladies of the city joined with the General Assembly in tendering to the gallant soldiers a banquet, where all honors were accorded to the boys in blue, who had won fame on so many battle-fields. By the first of May, the regiment had again joined the army of General Sherman, which was sweeping onward, overcoming all opposition. Throughout that campaign, crowded so full of skirmishes and battles, in almost all of which they took active part, the Fourth Iowa Volunteers maintained their honorable reputation, added largely to it, and made many sacrifices to wounds and death. In every skirmish and in every battle, the regiment behaved with its wonted gallantry. One of these skirmishes which became extremely sever was at Claysville, Alabama, on March 14, after which 39 enlisted men were missing.

By the 4th of May 1864, the Confederate and Federal forces once again faced each other. This time Joseph E. Johnson was in command of the Confederate forces, and had pulled them back to the area of Dalton, Georgia. At first look a frontal attack was demmed impossible, and the Federal army began to move around the flank of Johnson’s army; the goal being Resaca so as to disrupt the lines of communitation and supply. Then on the 13th, 14th, 15th, and 16th of May Johnson attacked the Federals at Resaca. The losses for the North were 2,747 and the Souths were close to 2,800. After the battle Johnson, once again, fell back to the cities of Calhoun, Adairsville, and Cassville.

The Fourth’s next obstical was the mountians near Allatoona. When the troops neared Allatoona it was found that the enemy was well prepared to give battle, so Sherman decided to flank the enemy by moving to Dallas, Georgia, and on to Atlanta. However, the enemy caught the troops before Dallas, and the battle of New Hope Church began.

On the 23rd of May Johnson detected the flanking movement again, and battled Sherman to a stand still. Confederate General Hardee was ordered to march that afternoon, by New Hope Church, to the road leading from Stilesboro’, though Dallas, to Atlanta; and General Polk to move to the same road, by a route father to the left. General Hood was ordered to follow Hardee on th 24th. On the 25th the latter reached New Hope Church, early in the day.

Hood immediately formed his corps parallel with the road by which he had marched, and west of it, with the center opposite to the church; Polk placed his men in line with it on the left of Hood’s line, and Hardee occupied a ridge extending from the Polk’s corps, across the road leading from Dallas toward Atlanta. This left Bate’s division holding the road.

Once everything was ready, Hood began to search out the enemy by sending Colonel Bush Jones, with his regiment and Austin’s sharpshooters, in all about 300 men. After advancing about a mile, this detactment encountered Federal General Hooker’s corps. Having the written order of his corps commander to hold his ground after meeting the enemy, Colonel Jones resisted resolutely the attack of the overwhelming Federal forces.

An hour and a half before sunset, a brisk cannonade was opened upon Hood’s center division, Stewart’s, opposite to New Hope Church. General Johnson reported, "The enemy (Hooker’s corps) soon appeared in so deep order that it presented a front equal only to that of Stewart’s first line." The Federal’s approached gradually but resolutely, under the fire of three brigades and 16 pieces of artillery, until within fifty paces of the enemy line. The line then wavered and broke for the rear. Then the Federal’s rallied and regrouped for a second time, but the enemy fire was to strong, and the line broke once more. Thus the engagement continued for almost two hours until the assailants gave up the attempt.

Then began the contest to entrench faster than the enemy. The lines soon passed to the left faster than that of the rebels. So much so, that next moring Confederate General Cleburne’s division pulled out of the lines and shifted to the end of the lines to continue the race to build the entrenchments. Between 5 and 6 o’clock the Federals were again moving. This time the Fourth Corps pushed at Cleburne’s new line, and found a soft spot. The Federal’s drove the enemy back while recieving enflaiding fire from the enemy infantry plus two pieces of artillery. This resitance slowed the advance long enough for the 8th and 9th Arkansas to get to the field. Thus the Federals were repulsed, and they fell back to a hallow behind their position.

This closed the main battle, and latter Confederate General Granberry charged the hallow and took 230 prisoners, 72 of whom were severely wounded. The regiment took part in the assult on Kenesaw Mountian, Georgia, on June 27, where three enlisted men were killed and seven enlisted men were wounded. From July 2nd to July 17th the regiment took part in operations along the Nickajack Creek and Chattahoochee River in Georgia. After this the rebels fell back, this time to the inner deffences of Atlanta. The goal of Sherman’s army was now within its grasp. Due to his constant retreat the enemy general Johnson was relieved and replace by General Hood.

Next began a vicious trench warfare for the city of Atlanta. The following was written by captain Henry Dwight:

"Here in the trenches before Atlanta, on this 15th day of August, I propse to give you some idea of the actual manner in which we fight. With us the pomp and show of war has become a matter of poetry rather than of fact. We need no gay dress or nodding plumes to inspire a soldier’s pride. Practical utility is what we look at in matters of dress and equipment. Look at most of the pictures. Two- thirds of the pictures in books and papers represent the soldiers with enormous knapsacks neatly packed; officers leading the charge in full dress uniform, with their sabers waving in the most approved style. Now this makes a pretty picute; but let me tell you that soldiers don’t put on their well-packed knapsacks to double-quick over a half mile of open ground in the hot sun at the pas du charge. Limited transperation soon exhausts an officer’s stock of white collars. The most elegant dress uniform will become torn and spotted, and the brightly polished boots will become soiled with mud, when one is reduced to marching in line-of- battle through swamps, thickets, and brier patches, and then sleeping night after night on the bare ground with only heaven’s clouds for an over-coat. Know ye, ladies all, yonder pretty-looking officer, with his spotless dress, resplendent with gold lace, will present a very different spectacle after a few months of campaingning. Dusty, ragged, and unshaven, his appearance is far more in accordance with his surroundings, far more becoming the earnest fighting man that you really suppose he is, than if he were arrayed as you formerly saw him, or as the pictures represent him to be.

Of course, in a war like this, upon which we all entered with the art yet to learn, the science has been progressive. Each succeeding year has developed new phases, and under such schooling our soldiers are indeed veterans;men whom practice has perfected in all the mysteries of military life. Each soldier knows that where he us to lie upon his arms all the time, in the face of the enemy, only seeking cover from the shape of the ground, he must now make strong fortification, to enable him to hold his position, and must arrange it to stop pieces of shell from the flank as well as bullets from the front. Had the army been as experienced at Shiloh as it is now, Beauregard would have come up and broken his army to pieces on our fortifications, instead of finding our whole army lying exposed to his attacks on the open field. At Forst Donelson, too, where we had to attack fortifications, we ourselves had no sign of a work upon which we could fall back after each day’s repulse; nor did the enemy seem to realize the value of his own works, for instead of quietly waiting the attack, he threw away his army by fighting out side his works.

It is now a principle with us to fight with movable breastworks, to save every man by giving him cover, from which he may resist the tremendous attacks in mass of the enemy. Thus at least we fight in Georgia, in the Atlanta campaign.

Wherever the army moves, either in gaining the enemy’s work, or in taking up a new line of attack, the first duty after halting is to create defensive fortifications-rude, indeed, but effective in enabling us to hold our ground against any force. In forming these field-works every man is to some extent his own engineer. The location of the line is selected by the officers, and each regiment fortifies its own front, each company its own ground.

Generally the situation will not allow of finishing the works at once, for the enemy will probably attack soon after you take position, which is on a commanding hill or some similar point. So you cause only a hasty barricade to be constructed. The front rank take all the guns and remain on the line, while the rear rank goes off in double quick to collest rails, logs, rocks, anything that can assist in turning a hostile bullet. These they place on the front of the front rank, and in five minutes there is a hasty barracade, bullet proof and breast high, along your whole line; not a mere straight work, but one varied with its salients and re- entering angles, taking every advantage of the ground, and cross firing on every hallow. You can do this after the enemy forms to charge you, while he is feeling you with artillery. Thus it takes just five minutes to prepare for an assult; and you can hold your line against an attack three times your number-and that, too, with but slight loss yourself-if your men be veteran soldiers.

It maybe that when your baracade is done you have time on you yet have time. Shovels and picks are always carried by your men, and to work they go to complete the frail works. A ditch is speedily made inside to stand in. The earth is thrown on the outside of the baracade, and the ditch deepened, so that, standing inside, your head will be protected by the parapet. Thus you speedily have a pretty substantial earth-work, with a step inside to stand on when firing, and a ditch to stand in while loading. If you are in the woods, you want to give range to your rifles, and have all the thick undergrowth small trees cut away for fifty paces in front. By felling these all the same way, the busy tops all turning outward, and trimming off the smaller twigs and leaves, and tangling the tops together, you have a formidable abattis, through which it shall be next to impossible for a line to advance alone, let alone against showers of bullets from your men at short range. This done, you can be making any amount of additions to your work as you have time, all tending to make it impregnable. Even after you have pernounced the job finished, your men will fuss and dig and tinker about the works to make them sure protection. They have no notion of taking a position, and then having it taken from them by a sudden assult. They will cut huge logs eighteen inches throuhg, and place them on the parapet to protect the head while they shoot through a space left between the log and parapet. They have also an ingenious plan for preventing these ‘head-logs’ from being an unjury to the service. Experience has taught them that a cannon-ball will sometimes strike one of these logs, and throw it off the parapet on to the troops inside. As a preventive skids, or stout poles, are placed at equal distance along the ditch. The logs being knocked off the top of the breast-works are supposed to roll along these skids, over the heads of the soldiers in the ditch, until the lodge saftely on the bank beyond.

The men will also amuse themselves with devising some new entanglement or snare to annoy the advance of the enemy. They drive palisades- stakes set into the ground with their shrapened points directed outward at an angle of forty-five degrees, and so close together that a man can not pass between them. In front of the palisades they place a strong wire so arranged that it can not be seen but will trip all comers. They will then imagine how astounded will be the rebels in charging the works to be suddenly tripped up and to fall forward on the sharp palisades.

Your main work being completed you can rest secure, only putting in an embrasure for a howitzer or two here or there. These howitzers are a fine thing to repel an attack, for they throw nearly a bucketful of small balls at a charge. Your skirmish line has, in the mean time, fortified itself sufficiently for protection, and can hold an attacking column long enough for you to form line in the main works before the enemy can get there.

One reads in the papers of the assults on earth-works, of the repulses, and yet one does not know what is contained in those two words-‘Assult repulsed.’ You make up your mind to assult the enemy’s works. You have formed line of battle, with a second and third line behind you for support. You march forth filled with the determination to accomplish the objective, yet feeling the magnitude of the undertaking. Two hundred yards brings you to the picket-line, and here the opposition commences. You dash across the space between the two lines, you lose a few men; and the enemy’s pickets, after making as much noise as possible, run back to their main works. By this time the enemy are pretty sure you are really coming, and open on you with artillery, besides a pretty heavy fire of musketry. This artillery throws the shell screaming through your ranks, producing more moral than physical effect, or throw shrapnell which, bursting in front, scatter myriads of small bullets around. You commence to lose men rapidly. The ball is opened. ‘Forward, double-quick!’ again; and while the whole line of the enemy open fire from behind their works, your men, mindless of this- mindless of death intensified, the bullets and the shells, they dash on with wild cheers.

The abattis with its tangled intricacy of sharpened branched snare your line. Tripping, falling, rising to fall again, the men struggle through this abattis. You get through this abattis, though the minutes are drawn out interminably, and though in each step are left brave men to pay for the ground. You get through a part of you and still rush on: the firing grows more fierce, the men grow more desperate. Your three lines have been almost reduced to one, and you strike anouther line of abattis. In this abattis are the palisades, which must be uprooted by force before a man can pass. You stumble, fall, tear your flesh on these stakes, and must stop to pull them up-stop, when every instant is an hour-stop, when you are already gasping for breath; and here open up the masked batteries, pouring canister into that writhering, struggling, bleeding mass-so close that the flame scorches, that the smoke blinds from those guns. Is it any wonder that your three lines are torn to pieces, and have to give back before the redoubled fire of an enemy as yet uninjured comparatively? And then the slaughter of a retreat there! Oftentimes it is preferable to lie down and take the fire there until night rather than lose all by falling under such circumstances.

This war has demonstrated that earth-works can be rendered nearly impregnable on either side against direct assult. An assult on fortified lines cost a fearful price, and should be well weighed wether the cost exceed not the gain. This, then, is what an assult means-a slaughter pen, a carnel house, and an army of weeping mothers and sisters at home. It is inevitable. When an assult is succesful, it is to be hoped that the public gain may warrant the loss of life requisite. When it is repulsed tenfold is the mourning.

It was a long time before the men could appreciate the value of the field- works. They would grumble and growl, recalling instances without number where the most charming little traps, the most elegant cross-fires, had been prepared with the great labor, and had never been attacked. I saw some men most beautifully satisfied as to the necessity for defensive works the other day. On the 22nd of July, before Atlanta, while these men were engaged in grumbling over some newly-finished works which the enemy would not charge, Hardee struck the Seventeeth Corps in flank and rear. His furious onset crushed the flank, and the Second Brigade of the Third Division to which these grumblers belonged, found themselves suddenly forming the unprotected left of the corps and attacked from the rear in those very works they grumbled so about building. When this attack was made they jumped the works to the front, or outside, and fought that way. This attack repulsed, they jumped back and repulsed an attack from the outside, or real front. Thus they fought, looking forall the world like a long line of these toy-monkeys you see which jump over the end of a stick. Thus they fouhgt for four long hours, cut off from all commanders, corps, division, and brigade, cut off from ammunition-trains, and only cheered by the noble example of General Giles A. Smith, whose command, broken by the first onset-all except one brigade-had rallied behind the works of the Third Division. Firing to front and rear, and to either flank they held their works, only changing front by jumping over the parapet as five assults were made upon them, successivly from front, rear, or flank, until the rebel onset was checked long enough to make sure the saftey of the immense wagon-train already saved by the Sixteenth Corps.

The next works of these men I saw, and seeing them, laughed. Experience had taught the utility of fortifications, and they fortied not only the front, but facing rear and every way, so that they could hold out if surrounded. They were not going to be caught without ammunition either; for each company had its little powder-magazine in a safe place, well stored with ammunition gathered from the battle-field. No grumbling was heard about building the works. All the spare time of the men was devoted to finishing up their pet works, standing off and regarding the effect of each addition with something of the same paternal feeling that an artist exhibits in reguarding the power of each master-stroke in finishing his picture."

At the great battle of Atlanta on the 22nd day of July, it was General Wood's division of the 15th Army Corps which held the extreme right of the Army of the Tennessee and when Gen. John C. Brown's division of Chetham's Corps broke through the line of the 15th Army Corps on the Atlanta and Augusta Railroad an captured De Gress' battery, Williamson's Brigade of Wood's division under the direction of General Sherman was moved in on the enemy's flank to retake this line and battery at the same time that Mersey's Brigade of the 16th Army Corps which General Logan has brought from that corps for the purpose of retaking the line, made the charge in front. At the same time, General Williams brigade charged on the flank an the two brigades retook the line of the 15th Army Corps and recaptured De Gress' battery and turned it again upon the enemy.

After the Battle of Atlanta, the 4th Iowa with the army of the Tennessee, on the 27th day of July, moved to the extreme right and took part in the noted battle near Ezra Church and fought on the 28th day of July where the rebel forces were completely defeated and driven back with great loss. The 4th Iowa swung with the Army of the Tennessee around the right of Atlanta to its rear, taking part in the fight at Jonesborough and forcing Hood to give up that stronghold, then returned to camp at Atlanta.

Up to this time, the regiment had lost 51 killed, 328 wounded, 54 from death by wounds, 200 from disease, but they had not lost hardly any prisoners.

The regiment, at three o'clock in the morning, heard a heavy, roaring sound, "like a double volley of heavy artillery." It turned out to be the destruction of the arsenals, foundries, etc., at Atlanta. The proud city was no more, and the enemy again fell back. The Fourth sought out the enemy and engaged them at Lovejoy Station, Georgia, on September 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 5th, during which one enlisted man was wounded.

The following was written by J. A. WILLIAMSON, Col. 4th Iowa Infantry, Commanding Brigade:

"HDQRS. SECOND BRIG., FIRST DIV., XV CORPS
Camp near Lovejoy's Station, Sept. 5, 1864

CAPTAIN: In compliance with Special Field Orders, No. 117, department headquarters, I have the honor to submit the following report of operations of this brigade during the campaign commencing May 3, ending with the occupation of Atlanta, Ga., Sept. 2, 1864:

The brigade consists of the 4th, 9th, 25th and 31st Regiments Iowa Infantry, commanded respectively, at the commencement of the campaign, by LtCol. S. D. Nichols, Col. David Carskaddon, Col. George A. Stone, and Col. William Smyth.

May 3, 1864, the Ninth, Twenty-fifth, and Thirty-first marched from Bellefonte to Stevenson. May 4, marched to Bridgeport, where the 4th Iowa, on return from veteran

furlough, joined the brigade, and continued the march to Shellmound. May 5, 6, 7, and 8, the march was continued, via Chattanooga, Gordon's Mills (on Chickamauga Creek), Gordon's Gap, to Snake Creek Gap. May 9, left camp early; marched to a point near Resaca, and then marched back again. May 10, in line of battle all day and night. May 11, built breast-works. May 12, moved out of the breastworks, and formed line of battle; remained in line nearly all day, and then marched to Sugar Creek. May 13, marched early toward Resaca. Skirmishing commenced at about 10 o'clock. At 3 o'clock we moved forward in line of battle, and drove the enemy into his main line of works. May 14 and 15, the brigade was continually under fire. On the evening of the 15th the 25th Iowa took part in the assaults made by BrigGen. Woods, commanding 1st Brigade. The loss was quite heavy in the affair at Resaca. May 16, entered the village of Resaca, detailed 25th Iowa for provost guard, rested a short time, and resumed the march to Lay's Ferry on Oostenaula River. May 17, 18, and 19, marched from Lay's Ferry to Kingston, via McGuire's, Woodland, and Adairsville. May 20, 21, 22, remained in camp near Kingston. May 23, marched from Kingston to Euharlee Creek, distance of more than 20 miles. On the 24th marched about twelve miles, encamped at Camp Gold Mine. May 25, marched about twelve miles and to a point about three miles south of Dallas; formed line of battle during heavy rain; lay under arms all night. May 26, moved at 11 a.m., with skirmishers in front, to a point three- quarters of a mile south of Dallas; formed line of battle, and sent out skirmishers, who very soon entered the town, after which we were ordered forward to a point about one mile east of Dallas; went into camp, but did not remain many minutes until I was ordered to move forward, which I did, and formed line of battle on the left of Gen. Giles A. Smith's brigade, of the 2nd Division, XV Corps. The line of battle, when formed, was from right to left, in the following order, viz: 25th, 4th, 31st, and six companies of the 9th Iowa Regiments, this being the order in which the brigade marched that day, and there being no time for forming the line in accordance with the rank of regimental commanders accounts for this formation of the line. As each regiment came into line I immediately sent skirmishers forward, covering the front. These skirmishers always found the enemy only a short distance in front, where a heavy skirmish fire was kept nearly all the night. Just before dark, after recon- noitering the ground in person, I deemed it advisable to advance the Thirty-first and Ninth Regiments to the crest of the high hill, upon the side of which they were origi- nally formed. This movement was approved by the general commanding the division, who came up just at the time the movement was completed. Prior to this there had been quite a heavy fire from the front, and the pickets and the sharpshooters of the division, under command of Lt. Williams, could only advance a short distance. It was now nearly, or quite, dark, and under cover of the darkness I hoped to be able to post a strong picket, or skirmish line, far enough in advance to render my line secure from surprise; and, in addition, gave strict orders for no man to leave the line, and that all should keep their arms in their hands. As soon as it was quite dark the attempt was made to advance the pickets, or, rather, a strong line of skirmishers. In doing this, and before they had been advanced far enough to prevent the line from sudden attack, a fire was opened from the enemy, which seemed to come from a line of battle, instead of a line of skirmishers. About 400 yards to the left of my line, and some distance to the rear, there was a hill, in an open field, which I thought it important to hold, and was so advised by orders from the general commanding the division. To do this required at least two companies, which I took from the 9th Iowa Infantry. I should here state that before it was dark one company of the Ninth had gained this position, and had reported to me that the enemy were in strong force in his front and left flank threatening them, leaving but four companies of this regiment in line. From the remaining four companies of the Ninth I was compelled to throw out skirmishers or pickets, to connect my skirmish line with the two companies on the hill to the left. I then sent Lt. Shields, of my staff, to the general commanding the division, to inform him of what I had done, and to state further to the general that it had been reported to me by Col. Carskaddon, of the 9th Iowa, and also by the officer commanding the two companies on the left, that my left flank was seriously threatened, and that I had no support anywhere on my left, and received the assurance that my statement could not be true. In this position I remained, my skirmish line being frequently attacked, and my whole command kept on the guard through the night. At daylight, in fact before it was light, I went to the left and found the skirmish line drawn back almost to the line of battle. I went in person to the officer commanding the skirmishers and ordered him to advance them. He reported the enemy but a short distance in his front in line of battle, and that a force was moving by the flank perpendicular to my line of battle. I pushed the skirmishers forward as far as it was possible, in front of the Thirty-first and the small portion of the Ninth which was there. About this time the skirmish line on the left, connecting the two companies, commenced giving way, and reported again that the enemy was coming up in heavy force between my left and the two detached companies. I sent Capt. George D. Hilton, of my staff, to inform Gen. Osterhaus of all that is above stated, and soon after, becoming more confirmed in my belief that everything was as reported to me, I sent Lt. Shields, of my staff, to repeat the same message, and assure the general commanding the division of the fact of the statements which I had instructed Capt. Hilton to give, as a representation made by officers commanding the skirmish line, as well as by other officers who had been reconnoitering. The events above narrated all transpired in a very short time and just at daylight. There was a heavy mist or fog, which made it impossible to see a man, or even a line of battle, more than 10 paces. While Capt. Hilton and Lt. Shields were gone with the message to Gen. Osterhaus the firing nearly ceased, and the apprehension of an attack was somewhat lessened, and the skirmish line to the left re formed. Both the officers returned from Gen. Osterhaus and assured me there was no enemy on or near my flank. While Capt. Hilton was reporting to me this intelligence, a heavy fire was opened on the flank driving in the skirmishers. I instantly went to the extreme left and found the skirmish line connecting with the two companies on the hill falling back. I had just given orders for the fragment of the 9th Iowa, then present, to form at a right angle to the position they then held, when a terrific fire was opened from the enemy, who had marched across my left flank. This attack was sudden, and the strong picket, which had been out on the left, coming in precipitately, and on account of the fog missing the flank of the regiment, thus coming to the rear among surgeons, cooks, litter-bearers, servants, and non-combatants generally, created some apparent confusion; when, indeed, but few, if any, who had been in line had given way. The enemy were soon repulsed and the fire ceased. My brigade being now several hundred yards in advance of any other troops, and both flanks exposed, I ordered it to fall back and connect with the left of 2nd Division, which had in the mean time refused the left of the position held on the evening of the 26th. Very soon after this I was relieved by the 1st Brigade, and ordered to occupy the position the 3rd Brigade had just left. Three days' subsequent fighting developed the fact that the enemy’s strongest point was in front of the place where my left rested on the night of the 26th and morning of the 27th. After being relieved by the 1st Brigade, as above stated, the brigade remained in camp, somewhat exposed to the enemy's fire, until about 5 p.m. on the 28th, when the enemy made a vigorous assault on Gen. Harrow's division on our right, when I was ordered to re-enforce him. My command fell in and double-quicked to his support, and took position on his right. How well, and in what time the movement was executed, I respectfully ask the general commanding to state for me. During the night of the 28th my command built a complete line of works. May 29, remained in works and building new works. Heavy firing on the skirmish line. Soon after dark my command was ordered to leave the works, with as little noise as possible, and take a position across the main road, so as to cover the rear of the remainder of the corps, which was to move out. About the time this movement was executed, and the 4th Division commenced to withdraw, the enemy assaulted our lines, and the firing became terrific. In obedience to orders, I sent two regiments (the Ninth and Twenty-fifth) back to the original position, and remained until daylight with the other two regiments, and then went with them back to the works on the right of the 4th Division. May 30, remained in the works, keeping skirmishers active during the day. May 31, remained in the works: skirmishers active. Late in the evening the enemy severely shelled every portion of my line. An attack was apprehended on the right, and preparations made to meet it.

June 1, at daylight, my brigade was ordered out of the works to another line a mile in the rear, which had been constructed to cover the withdrawal of the corps. When the corps had passed, my command acted as rear-guard on the march to New Hope Church, the enemy following us very close as far back as Dallas. June 2 and 3, remained in camp near New Hope Church. June 4, relieved Gen. Kimball's brigade near New Hope Church. Enemy left during the night. June 5, marched toward Acworth. June 6, arrived at Acworth. June 7, 8, and 9, remained in camp near Acworth. June 10, marched toward Kenesaw Mountain; camped at Big Shanty. June 11, received orders to reconnoiter in force with the remainder of the division; went forward and took position in reserve in front of Kenesaw Mountain. June 12, remained in camp doing but little. June 13, relieved 3rd Brigade. June 14, in camp through the day and built an advance line of works at night. June 15, at 2 o'clock I advanced my skirmish line with the skirmishers of the 1st and 3rd Brigades, and drove the rebels from the advance line of works; occupied a new line and built works during the night. June 16, 17, and 18, remained on the advance line skirmishing all the time. The enemy left the works on the night of the 18th. June 19, moved forward to the main line of rebel works. June 20, moved to the right of the 2nd Division, near the railroad, and built a line of works for the whole brigade. June 21, 22, 23, 24, and 25, remained in the position taken on the 20th, and during all the time labored to advance my skirmish line. June 26, received orders to march at 6 p.m.; marched a few miles to the right and relieved a brigade of the IV Corps. June 27, was notified that the 2nd Division, XV Corps, would assault the enemy's line in my front at 8 a.m. In obedience to orders I sent 150 men under command of Capt. Daniel E. Cooper, 4th Iowa, brigade officer of the day, to clear the rifle-pits on the right flank of the as- saulting column; though exposed to terrible fire,

Capt. Cooper and his men performed their part in the most gallant manner, carrying the pits by assault, using the bayonet freely. From June 28 to July 2, inclusive, the brigade remained in this line of works, skirmishing all the time and suffering considerable loss. July 3, the enemy evacuated the works on the night of the 2nd; marched to Marietta and camped east of the town. July 4, marched at 9 a.m. toward the right of our army; marched 12 miles and encamped. July 5, 6, and 7, changing position by short marches. July 8, took position in front line and built breast-works for the entire command. July 9, 10, and 11, remained in this line. On the night of the 10th the enemy evacuated their works in our front. July 12, 13, and 14, marching from the right of the army on the Chattahoochee River to the left of it at Roswell, where I crossed during the night of the 14th. July 15 and 16, remained in camp. July 17, marched at 5.30 a.m. toward Atlanta. July 18, marched to Henderson's Mill. July 19, marched to Decatur. July 20, marched near Atlanta and built a line of works. July 21, advanced our line and built another line of works. On the 22nd, about 8 a.m., in accordance with orders, my command moved out of a line of works which it had constructed on the night of the 21st, going in a westerly direction about three- quarters of a mile, to a line of works which the rebels had abandoned the night of the 21st. The brigade had but three regiments preent, via the 4th, 9th and 25th Iowa Infantry Regiments. I sent skirmishers to the front to join the skirmishers who had been sent out the day previous, making in all 150 men, besides officers, on the skirmish line. I also sent 100 men, besides officers, for fatigue duty, to assist in erecting a battery to my left. With the remainder of my command, the Fourth and Ninth in front and Twenty-fifth in reserve, I commenced transforming the rebel line of works into a line for the defense of my command. The transformation consisted in removing the embankment and abatis to the opposite side of the ditch. This work was soon accomplished, the command remaining close to their arms after the work was done. About 2 o'clock the action commenced on our immediate left, the rebels attacking the 2nd and 4th Divisions of the XV Corps. When the action had lasted half an hour, or perhaps longer, the rebels carried the works in front of the 2nd Division, capturing Capt. De Gress' battery of 20-pounder Parrott guns. In accordance with orders of the general commanding the division, I changed the front of my line, letting my right rest where it was, and swinging my left back, connecting my left with the right of the 1st Brigade of our division. I remained in line of battle for a short time awaiting the advance of the rebels, but they did not come. Gen. Woods ordered me to advance in two lines and flank the work from which the rebels had driven our forces a short time before. I commenced the movement, the Fourth and Ninth in first and Twenty-fifth in second line, and very soon came under a heavy fire, to which the command was exposed only for a short time, for it soon came under cover on the margin of a little stream. Here was a short delay in getting through a thick bramble. The line was soon formed on the opposite side of the stream when the command was given to go forward, which it did gallantly, flanking and carrying the work and recapturing De Gress' battery, all in the shortest possible time in which a work of this kind could be done. I left the Ninth in the works, sending the Fourth to the right to occupy a rebel battery which commanded the head of a ravine which led to our line in the only place where there was not a breast-work. The regiment had not more than formed before it was assaulted by a brigade of rebel infantry, under command of Col. Baker, and a very stubborn fight ensued. The regiment nobly held the position, and finally repulsed the assault, inflicting great loss on the rebels in killed, wounded, and prisoners. The 37th Alabama (rebel) was, according to the statement made by prisoners, nearly annihilated in this engagement. The honor of recapturing De Gress' battery is due to the Fourth and Ninth Regiments, men of both regiments arriving there about the same time. After the last assault made by the rebels was repulsed, the command went to work changing the rebel works, and constructing new works, completing them against daylight, at which time I received orders to move to the left of the XVI Corps, some two or three miles to the left of our position. Loss in this engagement was 36, five being killed, two missing and 29 wounded, including LtCol. Nichols of the 4th Iowa, who was slightly wounded in the thigh in the early part of the engagement. Soon after daylight on the 23rd we moved and took our new position. Sunday, the 24th, was spent in destroying the railroad near Decatur. Remained in camp on the 25th and until night of the 26th, when I received orders to move with the balance of the division, which I did, taking a position to cover the rear in a movement being then made to the extreme right of the army. On the 27th at daylight my brigade moved, covering the rear, and marched all day toward the right, arriving at a place about 10 p.m., where we bivouacked until daybreak, when I moved forward a short distance and went into line of battle in the center of the division. Here we halted a short time and then advanced in line of battle obliquely to the left, and wheeling to the left. After advancing in this manner for about one mile, or probably a little more, in obedience to orders I halted and formed line of battle in two lines, the Fourth and Twenty-fifth in front, and the Ninth in rear, in reserve. As soon as the line was formed I ordered the construction of temporary breast-works, which the men willingly and hastily constructed. In about three-quarters of an hour after taking this position the rebels made an attack on our lines to my right. The rebel assaults were determined and fierce, lasting for nearly three hours, but during this time my command was but little engaged, as the rebel attack did not extend farther than to a point opposite my right flank. July 29, remained in camp and built breast-works. July 30, relieved by a brigade of the XVII Corps and moved in a reserve position, and sent the 9th Iowa to picket the extreme right. July 31, in camp.

Aug. 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5, in camp and doing picket duty. Aug. 6, moved about one mile to the front and took a position on the left of the XIV Corps, and built a line of works. Aug. 7, men under arms all day. Aug. 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12, remained in line; more than half the time under arms, in apprehension of an assault. Aug. 13, my com- mand took part in the assault made by the division on the enemy's skirmish line, mak- ing a complete success, capturing nearly the entire force in the pits. Aug. 14, 15, 16, 17, and 18, remained in works, making demonstrations almost daily against the rebel works, losing some men each day. Aug. 19, advanced my line to the front of 1st Brigade, Twenty-fifth and Thirty-first Regiments occupying line, and digging intrenchments. August 20, making intrenchments. Aug. 21, 22, 23, 24, and 25, occupying our works without much excitement or fighting. Aug. 26, marched at dark toward the right of the army; marched all night and until 10 a.m. on the 27th. Aug. 27, in camp. Aug. 28, marched at 7 a.m., arriving at the Montgomery railroad about 11 a.m.; took position on each side of the railroad, 4th and 25th Iowa building a line of earth-works. Aug. 29, in camp; Ninth and Thirty-first Regiments engaged in destroying railroad. Aug. 30, marched to a point about one mile north of Jonesborough, and sent two regiments, Twenty-fifth and Thirty-first, to support some cavalry on the right; cavalry went away as soon as the regiments came up. The other two regiments (Fourth and Ninth) went to the front. All the regiments built breast- works during the night. Aug. 31, during the forenoon the Twenty-fifth and Thirty-first were relieved by the XVI Corps, and went into the front line and again built a substantial line of breast-works. The 4th Iowa was also twice moved into new positions and built works. About 10 o'clock I sent 100 men (50 from each the Fourth and Ninth Regiments) to support a battery placed in an advanced position on the right. About 3 o'clock the rebels made an assault on our front line. The 100 men from the Fourth and Ninth did their duty in supporting the battery, and succeeded, under the immediate direction of the general commanding the division, in bringing the guns off from under a heavy fire from the enemy, who had nearly surrounded them. During the assault four companies of the 9th Iowa under Capt. McSweeney went forward and took a position in an interval between the right of the 4th Division and the left of the 3rd Brigade, where there were no intrenchments, and while the battle continued succeeded in throwing up temporary works, which enabled them to hold the position. The enemy were repulsed with loss. During the night a regiment of the 1st Brigade (the 30th Iowa) partially constructed a line of works on the right of the 25th Iowa. On the morning of Sept. 1, I relieved this regiment with the Twenty-fifth, which completed the works and occupied them.

Sept. 1, lay in works all day. Heavy skirmishing in the afternoon. Two hundred men on skirmish line. Fourth Iowa took a new position detached from, and on the right of, the division and built a good line of intrenchments. Sept. 2, the enemy having left during the night, the brigade was ordered to march with division in pursuit. Marched about five miles, and formed line of battle, and halted for a short time. A sharp engagement was soon brought on by the 4th Division, and my brigade was ordered to the left of it. The Thirty-first took position in the front line, the other regiments in rear, and during the night all intrenched themselves behind good works. Sept. 3, 4 and 5, occupied our works; constant skirmishing. In obedience to orders, I moved the brigade out at 8 o'clock in the night of the 5th, and marched to Jonesborough with the division, and took the same position which I left on the 2nd instant.

So closes the record of this memorable campaign. I could not make it more brief and do justice to the regiments of the brigade. The vast amount of labor done by this command, in addition to the marching and fighting, and the cheerfulness and zeal with which it has been performed, is sufficient to encourage the best hopes for the success of our army. The troops have neither hesitated nor murmured at any privation or labor. To the officers and men I owe a debt of gratitude for their prompt and willing obedience to orders.

To my staff officers, Capts. Anderson and Darling and Lts. Shields, Nuckolls, and Crane, I am greatly indebted for efficient services. Their bravery and competency will commend them to any officer under whom they may serve. I cannot close this report without mentioning in terms of praise my faithful orderly, George Simms.

The casualties in the brigade during the campaign have been 280."

On the 5th, the Army of the Tennessee started thitherward, and shortly afterwards encamped at East Point, where it remained during the rest of the month. Here the regiment, which had been reduced during the campaign to less than two hundred men, underwent several changes as to its officers. Major Nichols was promoted to the lieutenant-colonelcy, and Captain Anderson appointed to the vacancy. Several line officers, whose term of service had expired, resigned.

In the pursuit of Hood's army which began October 5th, the Fourth Iowa took part. During a period from September 29th to November 3rd the regiment took part in operations in Northern Georgia and Northern Alabama against Hood and Forrest. During this time the Fourth took part in the skirmish at Snake Creek Gap, Georgia, on October 15th. On October 25th the regiment made a reconnaissance from Gaylesville to Turkeytown, Alabama.

November 15th to December 10th saw the regiment take part in the Savannah, Georgia Campaign which consisted of General Sherman’s March to the Sea. Beginning on the 10th and ending on the 21st of December the men were involved with the siege of Savannah, Georgia.

From January to April the Fourth took a very active part in the Carolina Campaign. On January 25th the regiment made a reconnaissance to the Salkehatchie River, South Carolina. February 15th saw the regiment engaged in a sharp skirmish at Congaree Creek, South Carolina. The regiment spent the following days, February 16th and 17th, in numerous sharp skirmishes around Columbia, South Carolina. Then enactivity settled in, until March 19th, when the Battle of Bentonville, North Carolina, began. The Fourth lost three enlisted men killed and three enlisted men wounded in the four days of battle. On March 24th the regiment occupied the city of Goldsboro, North Carolina. April 10th to April 13th was a time of slow advance upon the city of Raleigh, North Carolina. Finally all the marching ended with the occupation of Raleigh.

Shrotly after this the war ended, and the regiment moved to Washington for "The Grand Review". After remaining for some time in camp near Washington, the regiment proceeded to Louisville, Kentucky, where it was mustered out of the service July 24, 1865, having served nearly four years. A correspondent of the New York Tribune says of Williamson's Iowa Brigade, in the battle of the 22nd: "It was one of the bravest, truest, most tenacious fighting brigades that has marched to the rescue of our Nation's liberties." The Fourth had fought bravely at Resaca, New Hope Church, Kenesaw Mountain and at Jonesboro, until losses had reduced its numbers below two hundred. Major Nichols was severely wounded, Captain Anderson was wounded at Jonesboro; Lieutenants Baker and Cramer were killed at Ringgold. In response to the request of the Adjutant General of Iowa, near the close of the war, Colonel J.A. Williamson wrote a condensed report of the operations of the regiment, which extended over a very wide field, in many southern states, but could not give a list of "posts" occupied. He says:

"I can hardly realize the meaning of the term as connected with this regiment. We have stopped from time to time to rest, after an active campaign, but never had charge of any post, or fixed camp, from the time the regiment was really equipped for the field at Rolla, Missouri, in the fall of 1861."

Only those who have had the same experience can realize the feeling, which old soldiers had in common, that it was useless to make definite calculation upon remaining even a single day in one locality. While troops did remain in the same camp, sometimes for weeks, or months, they never knew how quickly a change would be made, and therefore, in time of war, the soldier's life is very much the same as that of the Nomads, ready to break camp and to move upon the shortest notice. Such was, in a most pronounced degree, the experience of the Fourth Iowa Infantry during its long period of service from 1861 to 1865.

Inseparably connected with the history of this regiment is that of the man who first commanded it, and under whom it won its first glorious victory. Subsequently he won high honor as a General and enjoyed the personal friendship and confidence of President Lincoln and General Grant. Since the close of the war, he has achieved fame and distinction in civil life. Through all his career he has cherished the memory of the men of his old regiment, and has -- from time to time -- given evidence of his abiding friendship for them. This is therefore an appropriate place to record the official military history of Iowa's most distinguished soldier. The record is compiled from the files of the War Department in Washington and of the Adjutant General's office of the State of Iowa, and is therefore officially correct.

MILITARY RECORD OF MAJOR GENERAL GRENVILLE M. DODGE

Captain Council Bluffs Guards July 15, 1856.

Appointed Colonel Fourth Iowa Infantry June 17, 1861, and ordered into camp at Council Bluffs.

Commissioned Colonel Fourth Iowa Infantry July 6, 1861.

During July marched with part of his regiment to Missouri State line against Poindexter, who, with 1,200 Confederates, was threatening Southwestern Iowa. Poindexter retreated when Dodge approached.

Reported at St. Louis with Fourth Iowa Infantry August 13, 1861.

Proceeded to Rolla, Missouri, August 24, 1861.

Assigned to command of post at Rolla, October 9, 1861.

Commanded expeditions to Houston and Salem, November 1, 1861. Enemy defeated in both engagements.

Wounded in left leg, December 15, 1861.

Assigned to command of First Brigade, Fourth Division, Army of Southwest, January 21, 1862. Advanced to Springfield. That place occupied February 13, 1862.

In engagements at Sugar Creek, February 17, 1862, and Cane Creek, February 20, 1862.

Defeated Gates' command at Blackburn's Mills, February 27, 1862.

Battle of Pea Ridge, March 6, 7 and 8, 1862. Wounded in right side.

Commissioned Brigadier General of Volunteers, March 31, 1862.

Reported to Major General Halleck at Corinth, June 6, 1862, and ordered by him to report to Brigadier General W.F. Quimby, commanding District of Columbus, to rebuild Mobile & Ohio Railroad.

June 28, 1862, assigned to command of Central Division, Army of Tennessee, with headquarters at Trenton, Tennessee.

Finished rebuilding Mobile & Ohio Railroad in August and built stockades and earthworks at all its important bridges and stations.

During the time in command at Trenton the captures of Dyersburg, Huntington and O'Brien were made, and Villipigue was defeated on the Hatchie River.

September 29, 1862, by order of Major General U.S. Grant, was assigned to the command of the District of Columbus, Kentucky.

Captured Colonel Faulkner and his command at Island No. 10. Also captured the State troops and conscripts, some 1,400 in number, twenty-three miles west of New Madrid.

October 30, 1862, assigned by order of Major General U.S. Grant to command Second Division Army of Tennessee, at Corinth, Mississippi,

November 15, 1862, assigned to command of the District of Corinth, by order of Major General U.S. Grant.

Extensive fortifications and important works in and around Corinth finished while holding that command.

December 1, 1862, a combined movement was made from Holly Springs and Corinth in which his troops captured Tupelo and Okolona, Mississippi, defeating the enemy and capturing the stores at those places.

December, 1862, by order of Major General U.S. Grant, moved to Lexington and Spring Creek, Tennessee, driving Forrest across the Tennessee River.

February, 1863, attacked Van Dorn's column at Tuscumbia, Alabama.

Place was captured with its stores, artillery, etc.

April, 1863, in command of Second Division, part of Fifth Division and portion of Cavalry Division of the Sixteenth Army Corps. Made expedition in Northern Alabama, defeating the forces of the enemy in the Tuscumbia Valley. During the movement the fights at Bear Creek, Cherokee, Burton Station, Leighton and Town Creek occurred. Immense quantities of stores for Bragg's army were captured and destroyed.

April, 1863, Chalmers and Ruggles were attacked and defeated at Tupelo.

June, 1863, crossed the Tennessee River at Savannah. Moved into Van Dorn's rear. Captured the town of Florence, defeating its garrison.

June 19, 1863, attacked Furgeson's command on Big Muddy, and stopped raid on Memphis & Charleston Railroad. Fighting was severe and loss considerable.

July 8, 1863, assigned to command of left wing Sixteenth Army Corps with headquarters at Corinth.

July 14, 1863, defeated a portion of Roddy's command at Jackson, Tennessee, and captured a large number of prisoners.

August 15, 1863, made raid on Granada, Mississippi, capturing a large number of locomotives, cars, railroad stocks, stores, etc., and defeated the enemy at Water Valley and Granada.

While in command at Corinth organized and mustered into the service First West Tennessee Cavalry, First Alabama Cavalry, First Alabama Colored Infantry, and several companies of colored troops for siege artillery.

October 30, 1863, command was attached to command of Major General Sherman then moving into Middle Tennessee.

During months of November and December, 1863, rebuilt Nashville & Decatur Railroad, also pontoon bridges across Tennessee River at Decatur, Alabama, and the Duck and Elk rivers, an constructed good and substantial earthworks and stockades at all the important bridges and points. During this time the command had several engagements with the enemy, and captured and fortified Decatur, Alabama.

January, 1864, organized and mustered into service Second and Third Regiments Alabama Colored Infantry.

May 5, 1864, in command Sixteenth Army Corps in the field at Atlanta campaign. Took part in the battles and engagements at Ships Gap May 6th, Snake Creek Gap May 9th, Resaca May 11th, Estounula River May 12th, Kenesaw Mountain, Roswell, Decatur July 21st, Atlanta July 22nd, Ezra Church July 28th.

Commissioned Major General June 7, 1864.

Wounded in head August 19, 1864.

October 14, 1864, ordered to City Point, Virginia, to visit General Grant.

November 3, 1864, assigned to command of District of Vicksburg and to command of left wing Sixteenth Army Corps.

December 2, 1864, assigned to the command of Department and Army of Missouri.

December 9, 1864, commissioned Major General Missouri State Militia.

January 30, 1865, Department of Kansas added to Department of Missouri.

General Jeff C. Thompson surrendered Confederate forces in Arkansas.

During January, February and March, 1865, made Indian campaigns on the Plains, opening up the stage lines and rebuilding telegraph lines which had been destroyed by the Indians.

1865-66, made Indian campaigns extending from Arkansas River on south to Yellowstone on north. In these campaigns several severe battles were fought by forces under Generals Sanborn, Ford, Conner, and Colonels Cole, Walker and others. Treaties of peace were made with the Comanches, Apaches, Southern Cheyennes, an other Southern Tribes, and a council was held with the Northern Cheyennes, Arapahoes and Sioux at Fort Laramie, and basis for treaty agreed upon. For services in this campaign received the thanks of the Legislature of Iowa.

Resigned March 1, 1866.

Accepted May 30, 1866.

SUMMARY OF CASUALTIES

Total Enrollment 1557

Killed 61

Wounded 338

Died of wounds 54

Died of disease 239

Discharged for wounds, disease and other causes 33

Captured 49

Buried in National Cemeteries 136

Transferred 37

Colonel Dodge was himself wounded in the right side.

The regiment furnished a Major General, a Brigadier General, several Colonels, Lt Colonels and Majors for other Iowa regiments and in the state stands in the first ranks of troops who went out from the state, and in the National stands in the front ranks of the fighting regiments of the Civil War. I doubt if any regiment can show a record of as many battles as it was in and only lost 49 men captured or missing. This shows how well disciplined, trained, and commanded it was. It reached Iowa, at Davenport, on the 28th, numbering four hundred and fifty seven men and twenty-three officers. Entering the service with 1,000 men, three hundred had been added to its ranks as the war progressed. Now, at the close, the 1,300 were reduced by sickness, disability from hard marches, wounds, death, starvation in Rebel prisons, nearly eight hundred. Only 225 men of the original enlistments survived. When Co. B. of the 4th Iowa was mustered out, it had 14 of its original members left. Such was the terrible waste of four years of war in one regiment.

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